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We study the emergence of organizational forms, focusing on two mechanisms—reconfiguration and transposition—that distinguish the founding models of the first 26 biotechnology
companies, all created in the industry’s first decade, from 1972 to 1981. We analyze rich
archival data using hierarchical cluster analysis, revealing four organizational variants of the
dedicated biotech firm (DBF). Three were products of reconfiguration, as executives from Big
Pharma used past practices to incorporate new science. One DBF variant resulted from
‘amphibious’ scientists who imported organizing ideas from the academy into their VC-funded
start-ups. We argue that such transpositions are fragile, yet charged with generative possibilities. Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society.

INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurial activity is so often equated with economic growth and innovation that its role as an
engine of social invention has been comparatively
overlooked. We, therefore, examine how entrepreneurs cobble together different practices and templates to fashion new organizational forms and
theorize why these forms vary in the degree to which
they transform and reorder the social world. To do
so, we utilize an original data set that affords insight
into the building blocks used to assemble the first
generation of biotechnology companies. Central to
our inquiry is a conceptual distinction between two
types of recombination: reconfiguration, a mechanism through which familiar attributes and elements
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are put together in new but recognizable ways; and
transposition, a mechanism through which attributes
and elements are introduced into foreign domains,
spawning new-to-the-world forms of organizing.
Our temporal setting is the 1970s, an era rife with
scientific breakthroughs in the biological sciences,
but murky with respect to the commercialization of
these discoveries. Initial ideas about how to convert
novel science into a business were routinely wrong.
The retrospective accounts of key participants stress
that if they had known all the obstacles and costs,
they surely would not have undertaken their efforts
(Perkins, 2002; Byers, 2006). In a departure from
the linear process of discovery and exploitation
often described in the entrepreneurship literature, we
show that chance, necessity, and naïveté—rarely
mentioned in explanations of entrepreneurial outcomes—were essential in the invention of new organizational models (Boyer, 2001; Hughes, 2011:
34–44).
An apt image for this process of genesis is playing
with Lego pieces: some parts fit together, some do

Amphibious Entrepreneurs and the Emergence of Organizational Forms
not, and some are attachable but unstable. If new
pieces from a different Lego set are introduced, previously unrecognizable shapes often result. In a
similar manner, we contend, new organizations are
created. We argue that such emergence is fundamentally relational. In building new models, individual
agency takes a back seat to the social forces of juxtaposition, where at the intersection of previously
separate networks, ideas and models flow and new
career pathways are formed (Powell et al., 2005;
Padgett and McLean, 2006; Vedres and Stark, 2010).
From this vantage point, the earliest biotechnology
companies are odd compounds of elements from the
worlds of academic science, venture finance, and the
established pharmaceutical industry. Guided by
habit as much as foresight, biotech’s founding scientists, financiers, and managers created new organizational forms that were neither entirely random
nor fully predictable, in some cases reconfiguring
existing practices, in others forging novel arrangements with no recognizable precedent and little
chance of survival.
We emphasize that our goal is not to evaluate
which firms proved to be commercially viable.
Instead, we seek to understand how and why certain
attributes combined. Our approach conceives of
organizational forms as bundles of attributes and
practices. In a nascent field, uncertainty and controversy surround what a firm should look like and
what elements it should contain. Our aim is to explicate how familiar practices were innovatively rearranged and how foreign elements were thrust
together to trigger social invention.
We create an original data set that affords insight
into how the different attributes that formed the first
generation of companies were assembled. Founded
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, these firms were
unusual for their time because they hewed neither to
an industrial nor an academic model. They emerged
out of the academy but utilized elements from the
fields of finance and industry to produce a new type
of science-based firm. To be sure, technologically
sophisticated companies had long used scientific
knowledge to create novel products, and university
labs were not averse to industry-sponsored research
projects. But the biotech model was different in
three respects. First, these firms attempted to both
advance science and derive economic value from
such advances. Second, a considerable portion of the
investment in these early firms was contingent on
the quality of the science they created. Third, no
university department followed the collaborative
Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society
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approach to science that many of these companies
pursued, in which a researcher would drop what she
was working on to help others advance their project.
We employ hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA) to
identify two fundamentally different models among
these early firms: a commercially oriented prototype
and a science-oriented prototype. We find that not
all possible options for organizing bioscience
research were pursued during this formative era. For
example, no new nonprofit research institutes were
created, nor did any large corporation attempt a
stand-alone corporate R&D enclave along the lines
of Bell Labs. Nor did an established player build an
incubator to shepherd start-ups. Our analysis of how
elements were pieced together suggests that some
models were not conceivable, whereas others
depended upon which attributes adhered to, and followed on, one another.
The archival evidence illuminates how ideas and
organizational practices crossed significant boundaries and eventually combined to produce novel forms
of organization and new careers. These new spaces
were created by trespassers, not by professional
managers, university administrators, or government
officials. We label such boundary crossers ‘amphibious’ entrepreneurs because they occupied positions
of influence in disparate social worlds: the academy
and the biotech start-up. More generally, we assert
that amphibious entrepreneurs play a crucial, if unintentional, role in the emergence of new forms by
carrying practices and assumptions across domains.

RECONFIGURATION VS.
TRANSPOSITION: A PRAGMATIST
VIEW OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP
All novelty involves some form of recombination,
but we argue that it matters greatly whether the
recombination incorporates familiar elements
(i.e., borrowed from related or adjacent sectors or
industries) or foreign components imported from
distant settings. Hounshell (1984), for example,
documents how Henry Ford and his advisors appropriated practices from other production industries—
flour milling, food canning, breweries, and
stockyards—to create the modern assembly line.
More recently, the movement of digital technology
from computing to photography provides another
example of an innovative reconfiguration (Tripsas,
2009). In both cases, the imported elements were
recognizable and credible. They were proximal
Strat. Entrepreneurship J., 6: 94–115 (2012)
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combinations drawn from ‘the adjacent possible’
(Kauffman, 2000), a kind of shadow future that
hovers on the edges of the current state of things—a
map of the ways the present can reconfigure itself.
In contrast, some recombinations involve the
movement of ideas and practices from a nonadjacent
domain, across social terrains to a place where they
are not initially recognized. Scholars have labeled
these transpositions. The best seller Moneyball provides an example: novel management practices
came to major league baseball via Wall Street analysts, whose ideas about arbitrage resulted in new
statistical metrics that supplanted decades-old player
evaluation practices and were labeled sacrilege by
traditional talent scouts (Lewis, 2003).
Clearly, such transpositions are distinguished by
the distance that the ideas and practices travel. We
propose that social distance has both cognitive and
moral dimensions.1 On the cognitive side, transposed practices are not readily recognized; they
seem out of context, off-key, or irrelevant; they do
not fit existing category structures. On the moral
side, transpositions may be attacked as inappropriate, outrageous, even profane. We find Howard
Becker’s (1963) work on ‘moral entrepreneurship’
useful in this regard. Becker characterized moral
entrepreneurs as ‘rule creators’ who label deviance
and mobilize support to proscribe it. Our view of
transposition involves a different sort of moral entrepreneur—one whose insistence on doing things the
‘wrong’ way rewrites the rules. Such violations are
much less frequent and less likely to be successful
than reconfigurations, which take place on uncontested moral ground. We argue, however, that even
failures of this sort generate ‘fresh’ action, which
may be subsequently exploited by others in different
domains (White, 2008: 279–283).
As further illustration of the difference between
reconfiguration and transposition, we emphasize that
innovation is an interstitial phenomenon (OwenSmith and Powell, 2004). Reconfigurations occur
between domains characterized by cross-traffic and
ongoing conversation—that is, across existing interstices. Transpositions occur between domains where
traffic is scarce and communication infrequent, thus
forging new interstices. As Simon (1982) pointed out,
interactions within and between subsystems are of
different orders of magnitude. By extension, because
they involve interactions between previously distant
1

We thank Joachim Lyon for helping us clarify these two
dimensions.
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social systems, transpositions are both less likely to be
accepted and more likely to produce radical social
novelty than ‘within-system’ reconfigurations.
Symbolic interactionist scholars refer to transposition-like activity as traffic across social worlds
(Strauss, 1978; Fujimura, 1987), wherein participants create new social spaces and synthesize existing cultural practices in unfamiliar circumstances.
Although the effect can be revolutionary, the intent
need not be. Padgett and McLean (2006) trace the
invention of the partnership form in Renaissance
Florence, with its unforeseeable spillovers in the
realms of art and science, to an attempt by ruling
elites to preserve the existing social order. We similarly contend that the novel organizational forms that
emerge from transpositions owe more to pragmatic
action than to visionary planning. Put simply, in the
face of unprecedented situations, people search and
experiment. Drawing on their existing knowledge
and routines, they survey their social worlds for cues
about appropriate action. People whose cognitive
frameworks and moral assumptions bear the imprint
of distant social worlds are more likely to forge
new tools for coping with an unfamiliar domain
because their knowledge, routines, and networks are
imported—transposed—from another context.
As an illustration of how a pragmatist perspective
shapes our view of agency, consider the first encounter in 1976 between the eventual cofounders of
Genentech, biotech’s earliest success story. Recently
let go from his analyst job at a venture capital firm,
Robert Swanson cold called UCSF associate professor Herbert Boyer. After ascertaining that Swanson
was going alphabetically through a list of attendees
at a recent scientific conference and that Stanford
scientist and future 1980 Nobel Prize winner Paul
Berg had refused a meeting, Boyer suggested an
appointment at 4:45 p.m. on a Friday (Boyer, 2001;
Swanson, 2001). Such a response affords many
potential interpretations: ‘You are unimportant and
have only 15 minutes;’ ‘If the meeting goes well, we
can get a drink;’ ‘I’d prefer that my colleagues not
see me meeting you;’ ‘Traffic and parking on a
Friday afternoon around UCSF are terrible, so this
will test his mettle,’ etc. Our point is that the circumstance was pregnant with multiple rationales and
opportunities and could have as easily led nowhere
as to the founding of Genentech.
The literature on organizational foundings emphasizes that entrepreneurs must work especially hard
to mobilize resources to launch new organizations
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan,
Strat. Entrepreneurship J., 6: 94–115 (2012)
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1983; Burton, Sorenson, and Beckman, 2002).
Nascent fields are characterized by ambiguity. There
is an absence of a dominant logic that guides activity
and a void regarding product definitions and industry structure (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hargadon and
Douglas, 2001; Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009).
Clearly, the resource-building aspect of new venture
formation is critical. But we also suggest that coming
up with a novel template in an unfamiliar domain
might be easier when the canvas has yet to be
painted—an advantage enjoyed by industries whose
founding companies are all de novo entrants
(McKendrick et al., 2003). Newcomers to a domain
are unencumbered by the baggage of established
practices (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). Instead, their
baggage comes from their domain of origin. When
introduced into a foreign context, even ingrained
modi operandi afford startling possibilities for
novelty.

THE EMPIRICAL SETTING
Many analysts of the early days of biotechnology
have assumed that the economic opportunities
created by scientific advances in the 1970s were
transparent to entrepreneurs and that these breakthroughs clearly opened up new markets for companies to exploit (Kenney, 1986a; Orsenigo, 1989;
McKelvey, 1996). Seen in this Schumpeterian
fashion, the subsequent organizational transformations in both the academy and industry followed
directly from this technological disruption. We want
to challenge the idea that technological opportunity
is paramount in the emergence of organizational
forms. Without question, laboratory advances had
outpaced commercialization. Ron Cape (2006:16)),
a cofounder of one of the first biotech companies
(Cetus), captured the pent-up feeling of the times:
‘It was like maybe a dam waiting to burst or an egg
waiting to hatch, but the fact is, there were a lot of
Nobel Prizes in molecular biology, but no practical
applications.’
Yet the people who built the commercial field of
biotechnology lacked a formal blueprint for constructing a new organizational form. Brook Byers,
venture capitalist and founding CEO of Hybritech,
San Diego’s first biotech company, put it bluntly:
‘We did not have the business model mapped out, or
the ultimate value proposition, which are all things
we do today in doing a start-up. We’re much more
sophisticated now. Back then, we didn’t have any of
Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society
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that’ (Byers, 2006: 21–22). Instead, these founders
carried tacit blueprints from the domains they knew
well. Those who were new to commercial activity
brought with them governance practices from
running academic labs (Zucker and Darby, 1996;
Jong, 2008). Refugees from the pharmaceutical
world carried a very different model of corporate
R&D. These scientists, financiers, and business
people all drew on their existing networks and prior
skills to develop a form that operated according to
quite different principles from either the traditional
vertically organized corporate hierarchy or the university laboratory. A new model of a science-based
company was constructed, based on fundamental
scientific research, horizontal flows of information,
porous organizational boundaries, a strong reliance
on intellectual capital and collective know-how, and
a strategy of pursuing innovation through collaborative ventures with other organizations.
Few, if any, of the participants set out to create
new organizational models. Rather, the unprecedented challenges of organizing life science businesses created an era of ferment. Some founders,
such as Amgen’s George Rathmann and Genzyme’s
Henri Termeer, felt confined by existing corporate
constraints and practices. Others, such as Ron Cape
and Peter Farley at Cetus, sought to minimize formal
organization in favor of a freewheeling, ‘anything
goes’ environment. Genentech was a virtual entity
for two years, using the UCSF laboratory of one of
its cofounders as an R&D site—which prompted a
nervous academic colleague to put a lock on the
freezer in his lab, for fear of losing his proprietary
reagents (Penhoet, 2001:96–97).2 The venerable
Salk Institute got into the fray, creating a commercial spin-off (SIBIA). Even Harvard, a bastion of
academic purity, entertained a proposal to invest
endowment funds in a biotech venture to be headed
by Mark Ptashne, then-chair of molecular biology
(Robb, 1981). When Harvard faculty protested,
Ptashne secured external VC funding and launched
2

In the first two years of its existence, 1976 to 1978, Genentech
had no labs or location of its own; instead it had contractual
agreements with cofounder Herbert Boyer to pursue research
on insulin and human growth hormone in his lab at UCSF and
with City of Hope Medical Center researchers in Los Angeles
to work on synthetic DNA. Although tensions arose over
Boyer’s starting a firm inside the university and an investigation was conducted by the faculty senate committee on rules
and jurisdiction, the university administration eventually
approved the relationship by reclassifying it in more conventional terms as an R&D contract and licensing agreement
(McKelvey, 1996: 99–107).
Strat. Entrepreneurship J., 6: 94–115 (2012)
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the company anyway (Genetics Institute). Centocor
began by licensing a patent for a monoclonal antibody developed by two of its founders at the Wistar
Institute on the University of Pennsylvania campus;
the license was later seen as a conflict of interest,
and the Institute required that the two scientists
relinquish their seats on Centocor’s board prior to its
IPO (Vaughan, 2000: 185).
These founding stories illustrate the initial absence
of a dominant organizational design. Instead, a
variety of novel (and in many cases, unstable)
arrangements resulted from the introduction of new
practices into old contexts, or the continuance of old
practices in new contexts. As the constraints grew
intolerable, groups of scientists, business people,
and financiers established new venues to pursue
genetic engineering. We turn now to a discussion of
how we built a sample of these initial entities and
coded their defining attributes.

DATA AND METHODS
Our sample is drawn from U.S.-based biotech companies founded from 1972 to 1981, the first decade
of the nascent industry. The period begins with
the founding of the first biotechnology firm (Cetus)
and the presentation of the seminal Cohen and
Boyer research on recombinant DNA at conferences
(Cohen et al., 1973). We close the sampling window
at the end of 1981, the year of Cetus’ record-setting
IPO and a year after Genentech’s landmark public
offering. By then, the regulatory environment had
stabilized, with congressional and judicial actions
that allowed venture capitalists to tap into new
pools of money (a relaxed interpretation of the
so-called Prudent Man Rule), encouraged universities to license scientific breakthroughs for commercialization (the Bayh-Dole Act, 1980), and
permitted the patenting of man-made organisms
(Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 1980). Our choice to
focus on the industry’s first 10 years is, thus, historically grounded, reflecting a founding era in
which the widest variety of types of biotech ventures were formed (Kenney, 1986b; Kaplan and
Murray, 2010).
Using a database collected by Powell et al. (2005),
we identified all biotech-related firms founded from
1972 to 1981, resulting in a population of 52 potential candidates. To be included, firms needed to have
pursued human health applications either from
founding or within their first five years. This elimiCopyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society

nated a number of botanical and veterinary genetics
ventures, as well as companies focused on supplying
the new field, yielding a final list of 26 companies
dubbed dedicated biotech firms or DBFs.3 A short
lifespan was not grounds for exclusion; indeed, one
of the early firms (DNAX) survived as an independent entity for less than two years before being
acquired by Schering-Plough.
We gleaned information on each company from a
variety of sources, including newspaper and magazine articles from the 1970s and 1980s, speeches,
S-1 and 10K filings, company profiles from the
Mergent and Hoover’s online services, scholarly and
popular books on the birth of biotechnology, and
interviews with biotech pioneers. The Regional Oral
History Office at UC-Berkeley’s Bancroft Library
was especially helpful; we combed more than 2,000
pages of interviews with scientists, entrepreneurs,
venture capitalists, and early employees of the first
biotech ventures. We also found relevant interview
archives from the Chemical Heritage Foundation,
the Smithsonian Institution, and the San Jose Tech
Museum. We consulted numerous scholarly studies,
including historical accounts (Kenney, 1986b;
Wright, 1994; Rabinow, 1996; Hughes, 2001; Vettel,
2006), as well as doctoral dissertations and science
journalism (Hall, 1987; Hybels, 1994; Teitelman,
1989; Robbins-Roth, 2000; Porter, 2004; Jones,
2005; Berman, 2007; Nelson, 2007). Where the
documentary record was thin, we supplemented with
semi-structured phone interviews with company
founders. Each of these 10 interviews lasted from 45
minutes to two hours, generating 200 additional
pages of interview data.4
Our analytical approach builds on comparative
case methodology (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007),
but we apply its inductive logic to a larger number
of cases than is typical. We distilled the copious
archival and interview data into histories of each
3
The choice to focus only on human biotech, and not plant and
veterinary science, has been made by numerous researchers
(Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Powell, Koput, and SmithDoerr, 1996; Zucker and Darby, 1996; Oliver and Montgomery,
2000).
4
To guard against post hoc impression management, we triangulated accounts from the interviews with real-time archival
data, such as company press releases, IPO prospectuses, newspaper and magazine articles, and numerous books written
during the mid-1980s on the burgeoning biotech industry. Here
again, we sought direct statements, not retrospective reflections, from company founders. This allowed us to corroborate
their recollections in recent interviews with statements recorded
during the time period in question, with the aim of minimizing
retrospective bias.
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firm’s founding, iteratively refining a ‘table shell’ to
ensure that we extracted the same information for all
cases (Miles and Huberman, 1984). We were most
interested in firm-level attributes that reflected distinct domains of both origin and function. Prior work
identified three institutional sectors from which
crucial elements of the biotech form were borrowed:
science, finance, and commerce (Powell, 1996).
Accordingly, we analyzed our cases for answers to
three questions: (1) How did the firm engage with
the world of science?; (2) How did it acquire
funding?; and (3) How did it approach the market?
For each firm, we listed the answers associated with
these questions. This selective coding was a pragmatic necessity, allowing us to avoid the unrealistic
task of cataloging hundreds of unique features
exhibited by each of the 26 firms.
Our coding required complete agreement between
the two researchers. We discussed any disputes until
all differences were resolved regarding an attribute’s
manifestation in the company and its predominant
domain of origin.5 Once the focal attributes were
selected for each case, we compiled and consolidated lists across all 26 firms, resulting in a master
list of 28 notable characteristics that were central to
how the first-generation biotech firms approached
the scientific, financial, and commercial aspects of
their enterprises.
Given our interest in how different configurations
of attributes were assembled into stable groupings,
we winnowed the list to eliminate those that were
shared by fewer than four DBFs. Our reasoning was
that unless an ingredient was salient in more than 15
percent of the cases, it could not be considered the
raw stuff of assemblage. Thirteen attributes met this
criterion.6 Table 1 provides a brief description of the
attributes, the domain from which they were drawn,
and their frequency of occurrence. Arriving at these
13 required a set of decision rules precise enough to
accommodate yes/no coding. The scheme we used
could be reliably replicated by other researchers.
5

We soon discovered that the same attribute served different
purposes for different companies. For instance, a ‘just-off
campus’ location allowed some DBFs to continue active participation in scientific research; for others, such locations
merely provided access to commercializable ideas. The different meanings attached to identical practices are discussed in the
findings.
6
To test our attribute selection process, we conducted the hierarchical clustering analysis (HCA) described later with the full
set of 28 attributes, as well as with the reduced set of 13. The
resulting clusters did not change. Rather, with the idiosyncratic
attributes included, three of the firms simply did not attach to
any cluster and remained outliers.
Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society
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Table 2 shows a correlation matrix for these 13
attributes, along with the location of each company
and its year of founding. Note the weak correlations between year, location, and attributes. There
is no evidence of regional DBF variants (e.g., ‘Bay
Area’ vs. ‘Boston’ models), as in Saxenian’s (1994)
work on information technology. Moreover, there
is no pattern of temporal accumulation, with later
firms copying the earliest ones. Nor do the attributes coalesce into a single, emergent DBF identity
near the end of the 10-year observation window.
Correlations between pairs of attributes are difficult
to interpret given the small sample (n = 26, df =
24), although correlations greater than 0.5
(Pearson’s r) are generally considered statistically
significant at the p < 0.05 level even for samples
of this size (Cohen, 1992). Using this criterion,
correlations can be definitively identified between
two pairs of attributes: a positive relationship (r
= 0.573) between ‘amphibious’ founders and publishing and a negative relationship (r = −0.575)
between having an academic scientist in a top
management role and the hiring of a senior manager
from the pharmaceutical industry. The relationships
between these pairs of attributes make intuitive
sense, and their fateful implications for the clustering are discussed later.
With these 13 attributes coded ‘1’ (present) or ‘0’
(absent) for each of the 26 firms, we generated a
rectangular ‘attribute-by-firm’ affiliation matrix.
Such matrices have long been used to determine
social structure within network data (Breiger, 1974;
Wellman and Berkowitz, 1988). Our objective is
analogous: to determine underlying patterns of cohesion among attributes that, prior to these early
biotech ventures, had not appeared together in stable
configurations. The sample size prohibits approaches
favored by inductive case studies, which typically
rely on either manual or mental techniques. Indeed,
‘tweener’ sample sizes have been problematic in
organizations research: too large for unaided crosscase comparison and too small for OLS-based analytics. Therefore, we employed hierarchical cluster
analysis (HCA), a proven multivariate method, for
our cross-case analysis (Tan, Steinbach, and Kumar,
2005). HCA is well suited to explore what we term
a sociology of compounds—the ways in which
diverse elements form composites. Indeed, Ruef
(2000: 706) employed HCA in tracing the emergence of organizational forms in health care, arguing
that ‘many of the most interesting organizational
forms are more properly seen as the evolutionary
Strat. Entrepreneurship J., 6: 94–115 (2012)
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Table 1. Attributes of early biotech companies
Attribute and domain
of origin
1. Research contracts
with large
corporations (finance)
2. Noted scientist(s)
(science)
3. ‘Just-off campus’
location (science)

4. Amphibious
scientist(s) (science)

5. Nontherapeutic focus
(commerce)
6. Nontraditional initial
public offering
(finance)
7. Pharma veteran hired
to run the company
(commerce)
8. All-star scientific
advisory board
(science)
9. Scientist in charge
(science)

10. Encouraged scientific
publication (science)

11. Prior entrepreneurial
experience
(commerce)
12. Growth through
acquisition
(commerce)
13. Venture capitalist
served in operational
role (finance)

Criteria for coding

No. (%) of firms
for which code = 1

Research contracts cited as a critical
source of operating revenue during
company’s first five years
At least one founder listed in American
Men & Women of Science1
Original company address located
within 10 driving miles of the
research institution with which
scientific founder(s) associated
At least one founder was a company
officer and (1) occupied an
academic position simultaneously or
(2) soon returned to full-time
academic research
Company’s espoused strategy centered
on diagnostics, vaccines, or other
nontherapeutic products
Firm went public prior to having (1)
any products in its pipeline and/or
(2) any patented intellectual property
Within the first five years, company
hired an experienced pharmaceutical
company executive as president
or CEO
Firm (1) had a formal scientific
advisory board (SAB) and (2) this
SAB included at least one renowned
scientist
Academic scientist served as president
or CEO at some point during first
five years of the company’s
existence
Firm’s publication record in its first
five years was above the sample
median on quantity and quality
measures2
At least one founder had been involved
in a prior start-up

21 (81%)

Within the five years following its
founding, the firm made at least one
acquisition
Venture capitalist (1) occupied
executive role or (2) actively
intervened in day-to-day operations
during first five years

19 (73%)
18 (69%)

14 (54%)

11 (42%)

11 (42%)

10 (38%)

9 (35%)

9 (35%)

8 (31%)

7 (27%)

6 (26%)

5 (19%)

1
American Men and Women of Science has been published since 1906. Nominees are selected by the editors or recommended by current
listees and by leaders of academic, government, and private research programs and associations. Inclusion in the book is based primarily on ‘research activity of high quality in science as evidenced by publication in reputable scientific journals’ (GCL, 2012).
2
All publications that list a company scientist as an author were totaled for the five years following the year the company was founded.
Quantity was measured as the total number of publications (min = 0, max = 174, mean = 36.77, and median = 31). Quality was measured as the average number of non-self citations per publication (min = 7.27, max = 425.43, mean = 85.44, and median = 70.6).
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* p < 0.05

1
−0.042
−0.142

−0.144
−0.120

0.121

0.093

−0.086

−0.005

0.013
−0.023
−0.283

0.251

−0.352

−0.158

−0.013

−0.298

0.282

−0.200

0.133

−0.133

−0.087

0.069

0.024

−0.010

0.196

2

0.158
−0.205

1

1

−0.007

−0.411

−0.023

−0.285

−0.007

−0.144

0.144

−0.029

0.259

0.480

−0.105

0.482

1

3

Correlations of organizational attributes

1. Geographic
location of
venture
2. Year founded
3. Noted scientist
founder(s)
4. Amphibious
scientist
founder(s)
5. All star science
advisory board
6. Encouraged
scientific
publication
7. Academic
scientist in
charge
8. ‘Just off
campus’
location
9. Research
contracts with
large cos.
10. Venture
capitalist held
operational role
11. Nontraditional
IPO
12. Grew by
acquisition
13. Prior
entrepreneurial
experience
14. Pharma veteran
hired to run the
co.
15. Nontherapeutic
focus

Attributes

Table 2.

0.012

−0.378

−0.308

−0.225

0.168

0.060

0.331

0.051

0.187

0.573*

−0.137

1

4

−0.132

0.089

0.470

0.177

0.195

0.260

0.150

−0.040

−0.359

−0.077

1

5

−0.197

−0.463

−0.123

−0.058

0.123

−0.185

0.386

0.356

0.256

1

6

0.195

−0.575*

−0.442

−0.015

−0.132

−0.355

0.150

0.135

1

7

−0.104

0.013

−0.159

−0.426

−0.104

0.114

−0.114

1

8

−0.175

−0.216

−0.144

0.036

0.023

−0.010

1

9

−0.023

0.417

−0.076

−0.036

−0.220

1

10

−0.103

−0.037

−0.169

0.085

1

11

0.085

−0.058

0.285

1

12

0.007

0.233

1

13

−0.037

1

14

1

15
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product of two or more parent forms.’ HCA, then,
accommodates our focus on the assembly of attributes borrowed from three ‘parent’ forms (academic
science, venture finance, and pharmaceutical
commerce).
Each of the 26 companies is represented by a
unique vector of dichotomously coded attributes. We
computed distances between each pair of company
attribute vectors using the Jaccard matching
coefficient, defined as the size of the intersection
divided by the size of the union of the sample sets.
This coefficient is subtracted from one to yield the
Jaccard distance between a pair of companies,
A and B:
Jδ ( A, B) = 1 − J ( A, B) =

A∪ B − A∩ B
A∪ B

.

The result is a symmetrical 26 × 26 matrix of
numeric distances between each pair of companies.
This dissimilarity matrix forms the input to the hierarchical clustering analysis, which systematically
agglomerates observations, starting with those that
are least dissimilar and progressing until all observations are members of a single cluster.7 In effect, the
technique searches for identical patterns of attributes, iteratively relaxing the standard of exact correspondence to produce a series of ever-larger
clusters. The technique seeks to optimize withincluster similarity and between-cluster dissimilarity
simultaneously (Rawlings and Bourgeois, 2004).
The result is graphically represented as a textual
dendrogram, sometimes referred to as an ‘icicle
diagram,’ presented in Figure 1. Reading from top
to bottom, the diagram displays the order in which
the earliest biotech firms clustered together, based
on similar attribute profiles.
As with most clustering procedures, HCA does
not compute an optimal number of clusters. Our
decision was aided by a common measure of cluster
adequacy, Krackhardt’s E-I ratio (Krackhardt and
Stern, 1988).8 The ratio ranges in value from 1 to
7

Other analysts have used the more common Euclidean distance measure to compute dissimilarities (cf. Ruef, 2000). In a
comparison of various distance measures, however, Finch
(2005: 96) determined that Euclidean distance is less appropriate for dichotomous data, commenting further that ‘the simplest
of the four measures of distance, the Jaccard index, works as
well as its more complicated competitors in terms of correctly
grouping individuals based on a set of dichotomous variables.’
In the spirit of choosing the simplest measure, we chose Jaccard
distance as the input for our cluster analysis.
8
Typically used in social network analysis, the E-I ratio is
computed according to the following formula: (# external ties-#
Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society

−1. An E-I ratio of 1 would indicate clusters of
companies with no internally shared attributes. In
our data, this limit is approached at the lowest level
of agglomeration (i.e., where the most similar two
companies cluster together and each of the remaining 24 companies is considered its own cluster). At
the other extreme, an E-I ratio of −1 would indicate
a cluster in which all attributes were shared (i.e., all
26 companies would have identical profiles).
We plotted the E-I ratio against the number of
clusters for each level of agglomeration. The plot
revealed two ‘elbow’ points, at four and nine clusters
(see Figure 2). We analyzed the change in slope of
the best fit line before and after x = 9 and x = 4,
determining that the change in the E-I ratio was
much more drastic below four clusters. At fewer
than four, the agglomeration rapidly erases meaningful dissimilarities between groupings of firms; at
greater than four, within-group similarity increases
at a decreasing rate, adding scant explanatory
purchase.
Based on these four clusters, we parsed the original affiliation matrix to create an aggregate attribute
profile for each group of companies. Comparing
these attribute profiles clarifies which elements were
most consequential in determining the branching
structure. Put differently, the cluster profiles reveal
how new organizations in an emerging field vary in
form. The final step in our analysis was to reexamine
the detailed firm case histories by cluster, gleaning
insights into what McKendrick et al. (2003: 63) have
termed the ‘composition rules about appropriate
combinations of features’ in emergent forms. We
turn next to an explication of these patterns of
combination.

FINDINGS
The results of our analysis are fittingly framed by a
comment made by Robert Luciano, CEO of ScheringPlough at the time his pharmaceutical firm acquired
DNAX, a tiny Palo Alto-based start-up, in 1982.
Luciano said, ‘Schering-Plough is not in business to
do research. It’s in research to do business’ (Kornberg,
1998: 138). Not only does the phrase portray the
internal ties) / # total ties. In our data, a ‘tie’ represents a shared
attribute among firms. Thus, the E-I ratio provided a computational basis for balancing commonality within clusters and differentiation between clusters.
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Figure 1. Results of hierarchical clustering*
*This textual dendrogram is read top to bottom, showing which companies were the first to cluster
(Repligen and Synergen, based on minimal dissimilarity) and proceeding downward as the clusters tolerated greater
dissimilarity. The vertical axis indicates the distance at which the clusters were agglomerated at each level. The level
highlighted indicates the number of clusters—four—we deemed optimal, based on the E-I ratio (see Figure 2).
Clusters were computed using the hierarchical clustering tool in UCINET 6.0. We employed the ‘complete-link’
method (i.e., ‘farthest neighbor’), which computes similarities on the basis of the similarity of the member
of the new cluster that is least similar to each other case not in the cluster.

Adequacy of fit (E-I ratio)

1.2
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Figure 2. Determining the optimal number of clusters
Note: The elbow point circled on the above plot suggests that four clusters offer the best fit. At fewer than four
clusters, the agglomeration rapidly erases meaningful dissimilarities between groups of firms; at greater than four
clusters, within-group similarity increases at a decreasing rate, adding little explanatory power.

collision of values and organizing principles that
propelled the earliest biotech ventures, it also evokes
the two mechanisms—transposition and reconfiguration—that resulted in different degrees of organizational novelty. On the one hand, reorienting
entrepreneurial activity to the purposes of basic life
Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society

science research required unprecedented financial
and organizational gymnastics (transposition); on
the other hand, harnessing complex and costly bioscience research to the goals of business demanded
innovative admixtures of existing commercial practices (reconfiguration).
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The cluster analysis reveals critical constellations
of attributes that were associated with scientific vs.
commercial primacy. Starting with all 26 DBFs (the
‘base’ of the icicle diagram in Figure 1), the sample
initially divides into two large clusters of 13 firms
each. The first cluster remains intact through five
successive reductions in allowable dissimilarity,
losing only one outlier (Seragen). This group, labeled
Cluster 1, bears the strong imprint of academic
science. As shown in Table 3, three attributes were
disproportionately consequential in separating
Cluster 1 from Cluster 2: (1) a noted scientist on the
founding team; (2) an amphibious scientist/founder
who alternated between academia and the start-up;
and (3) absence of a senior executive from Big
Pharma.9 Of these, the presence of an amphibious
founder is the most influential, accounting for 30
percent of the total distance between the initial
clusters. Twelve of the 13 companies had such a
founder.10
We first examine the attributes that characterize
Cluster 1, paying attention to the social worlds they
represent. Our findings illustrate how traffic across
these social worlds resulted in the invention of a new
organizational form that exemplified the notion of ‘in
business to do science.’ We then apply the same analytical framework in explaining three variants of the
‘in science to do business’ pattern seen in Cluster 2.
Cluster 1: In business to do science
Dominant influence: academic science

Cluster 1 firms were research driven, led by amphibious scientist-founders who moved back and forth
between campus and company. It may seem

9

To compute the influence of each attribute, we used the
squared Euclidean distance measure, defined as the sum of the
squared difference scores for each attribute. Squared Euclidean
distance is especially appropriate because the data are no longer
dichotomous, and it allows separate distance measures to be
computed for each attribute in order to isolate those that contribute most to the overall distance between the clusters. These
three attributes account for 66 percent of the overall dissimilarity between Cluster 1 and Cluster 2.
10
The lone exception, Seattle-based Immunex, struggled over
this very choice. Steven Gillis, scientific cofounder of Immunex,
recalls the decision to sever ties with Fred Hutchinson Cancer
Research Center in 1981: ‘Most of our competitors who were
involved in starting companies at the time were…staying in
academia. We thought that might be a real conflict of interest.
We wanted to make a clean break’ (pers. comm.). More tellingly, Immunex did not hire a senior executive from the pharmaceutical industry, and its founders remained in close contact
with researchers at ‘the Hutch’ (Wilson and Heath, 2001).
Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society

puzzling that Cluster 1 firms were half as likely as
Cluster 2 firms to have an ‘All Star’ Scientific
Advisory Board (SAB). Their histories make clear,
however, that such boards were considered superfluous by these firms’ scientist-founders. Because they
remained connected to the world of academic
science, these founders were not dependent on a
high-powered external committee. The most extreme
example is Biogen, where the founding team itself
was a ‘who’s who’ of life scientists from top universities in the U.S. and Europe. Worried about oversight from a nonscientist, Biogen’s founders wrote
into their articles of incorporation that the CEO
would report to the scientific board, not vice versa
(D’Andrade, 2001). The practice did not catch on
among biotech firms and was abandoned by Biogen
after seven years when the company hired Jim
Vincent, an executive at Abbott Laboratories, to run
the company. His description of Biogen’s founding
culture characterizes the operating assumptions that
were constitutive of the Cluster 1 firms: ‘The perception had been that everything else would take care
of itself if we had good science’ (Feder, 1992: 31).
‘Good science’ is a networked enterprise, dependent on the free flow of ideas and findings across
organizational boundaries to all corners of the
research community. Although active participation
in this global community was unusual for a fledgling
commercial entity, it was second nature for the
amphibious founders of these companies. Robert
Swanson (2001: 57) of Genentech characterized the
scientific openness of his academic cofounder,
Herbert Boyer, as follows:
‘Boyer’s philosophy . . . was that you gain more
from interaction with your academic peers than
you give up by telling the competition where you
are. So with interaction you can move quicker;
you gain more people willing to collaborate with
you. We knew then we weren’t going to have all
the best ideas, and we said, where do the academic
scientists go when they have an idea that they
think needs to be commercialized? We want them
to come to Genentech first . . .’
From a strategic perspective, scientific prominence helped Cluster 1 firms attract valuable external collaborators. For the younger scientists who
joined these firms, however, moving from a prestigious university to an unproven start-up was a huge
gamble. Staying active in the community of science
mitigated some of the risk. The following comment
Strat. Entrepreneurship J., 6: 94–115 (2012)
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Differentiating characteristics of the four DBF clusters
Cluster 1: ‘In business
to do science’

N
Ratio of firms with:
Notable scientist/founder
Amphibious founder
Senior pharma exec. in charge
Serial entrepreneur among founders
Nontherapeutic focus
Publications per firm (avg.)*
Citations per publication (avg.)*
List of firms

13

Cluster 2: ‘In science to do business’
2a: Spin-off
2b: Broker
2c: Tech start-up
6

1.00
0.92
0.08
0.15
0.31
584.54
66.63
Biogen, California
Biotech, Cetus,
Chiron, DNAX,
Genentech, Genetics
Institute, Immunex,
Molecular Genetics,
Repligen, Seragen,
ZymoGenetics

0.33
0.33
0.83
0.17
0.33
185.83
29.12
Genzyme,
Hybritech,
ImmunoGen,
Integrated
Genetics,
SIBIA, Xoma

3
0.67
0.00
0.67
0.33
1.00
148.67
45.35
Centocor,
Codon,
Genetic
Systems

4
0.50
0.00
0.50
0.75
0.50
266.25
44.76
Amgen,
Cytogen,Genex,
Enzo

*Publications tracked for the first 10 years post-IPO. Citations are as of October 2010, self cites excluded. Self cites disproportionately
boost Cluster 1’s citation counts. Source: ISI Web of Science.

from Axel Ullrich (2006: 22), an early Genentech
employee and now internationally known scientist,
gives new meaning to ‘publish or perish:’
‘We were worried that if we started doing commercial research we would have problems returning to academia if things wouldn’t work out.
We were discriminated against at that time. We
thought that if we (did) all this applied stuff, we
couldn’t publish. It would be terrible. We would
never get a job if the company failed . . . we would
be in the streets. So we had to publish . . . we had
to establish a university-like atmosphere.’

consulting firm). Cetus was in the 70s’ . . . I wanted
to continue the general idea of trying to use computer automation for important goals in biology.
They (the NIH) told me that they were going to
terminate my project at that time, and I was really
furious because I’d put in an enormous amount
of effort and it was just beginning to be really
productive.’
Similarly, Genentech began its R&D efforts by
funding two researchers at the City of Hope Medical
Center in Southern California who had just been
denied NIH funding (Kiley, 2002: 11).
Strange bedfellow: venture finance

Another university-like aspect of the Cluster 1
firms was the way they used corporate R&D contracts as substitutes for government grants, with
renewal of the contracts contingent on the achievement of specific research objectives (Kenney,
1986b). The founding of Cetus is illustrative.
Cofounder Donald Glaser (2006: 83), a Nobel laureate in physics who had moved into molecular
biology, saw the venture as a way to replace the loss
of a key NIH grant:

Although corporate R&D contracts were comprehensible to Cluster 1’s scientist-founders via analogy
to renewable government grants, venture capital
financing represented a brave new world. The influx
of investment capital into the hallowed halls of academia challenged established norms. Tom Maniatis,
a professor of molecular biology at Harvard and
cofounder of Genetics Institute, told the Washington
Post in 1981:

‘The NIH funding cut had more to do with starting
Cetus than it did with starting (a previous

‘(It’s) fascinating to see the effect on the minds of
all these scientists—the worry about whether you

Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society
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should dive into the money pile or whether the
pile is dirtying everybody . . . Over the years the
sense of academic purity is something which
developed out of necessity . . . since there was no
money a sense of saintlihood was required in the
situation. Now it’s not required.’ (Hilts, 1981: A1)
For their part, many investors were equally ill at
ease putting money into something as unpredictable
as fundamental scientific inquiry. A stock analyst’s
criticism of Molecular Genetics could have been
leveled at many of the Cluster 1 firms: ‘It didn’t
seem the company had a clear focus . . . It seemed to
me that I was funding a university’ (Lerner, 1987).
Such dissonance evinces the interpenetration of previously distant social worlds: venture capitalists
faced unprecedented challenges in their efforts to
justify investment in mini-universities; academic
researchers were conflicted (and often persecuted)
over involvement in science-for-profit.
Out of this turmoil emerged financial and organizational inventions—junior stock, limited research
partnerships, co-location of commercial and academic researchers in a university lab—some of
which were eventually ruled illegal (Perkins,
2002:10), while others resulted in lawsuits (Fox,
2000). A successful (and non-controversial) practice, however, involved the conversion of scientific
output into investment dollars. Given the enormous
costs and unpredictable timelines involved in discovering, developing, testing, and bringing to market
genetically derived human therapeutic agents,
venture capitalists needed a way to signal that the
biotech start-ups were making progress worthy of
additional investment. In traditional technology ventures, inventors build prototypes to make their ideas
tangible. Creating a working demo of a cancer
therapy, however, is a different matter. The publication of experimental results in a world-class journal
served as a proxy. Using research papers to attract
funding was an activity at which amphibious scientific founders excelled. Leveraging scientific reputation and output into research grants was a familiar
activity for any top scientist. This practice was
readily ported into the start-up setting. In a 2009
interview with us, Immunex cofounder Steve Gillis
(pers. comm.) explained:
‘It was interesting that Genentech . . . would
publish in their annual report the number of times
their articles were cited by other scientists. They
would have a graph of how many times Genentech
Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society

scientists were cited vs. other companies. And
they were proud that they were always in a leadership position. But we were always either second
or third. That was something that gave us pride,
and, believe it or not, in the early days, Wall Street
analysts looked at that, too.’
Influential by its absence: the
pharmaceutical industry

As noted in Table 3, having an academic scientist in
charge was inversely correlated with the presence of
a senior pharmaceutical industry executive guiding
the start-up. Genetics Institute was unique among
the Cluster 1 firms in its combination of a seasoned
academic leader (Mark Ptashne, then-head of
Harvard’s microbiology department) and an established pharma manager (Gabriel Schmergel, a
Harvard MBA and 14-year veteran of Baxter
Travenol). More commonly, a noted scientist took
on the role of CEO or president (Biogen, Chiron,
Molecular Genetics, Repligen) or was paired with a
business manager of lesser stature (Cetus, Genentech,
Immunex, Synergen, ZymoGenetics). Such asymmetries meant that Cluster 1 scientist-founders
encountered minimal resistance to their ideas. An
academic culture took root.
The absence of an influential executive from the
pharmaceutical industry was also reflected in
product development choices. Less than a third of
these firms pursued diagnostic applications. Rather,
their initial choices of therapeutic targets often were
new-to-the-world medicines, such as interferon,
with unproven applicability to the war on cancer.
There were exceptions, of course, most notably
Genentech’s calculated cloning of human insulin.
But in general, existing markets and specific target
customers figured less into the decision calculus
than opportunities at the cutting edge of science.
DNAX, for example, produced a plethora of highly
cited scientific papers, but never brought a product
to market. The same was true of Cetus and
Zymogenetics.
Although nearly all of these companies eventually
hired a pharma veteran as top executive, the values
and practices imprinted during their formative years
proved durable. The ‘invisible college’ model,
funded by corporate contracts and venture capital,
fostered an impressive level of scientific output,
which was then converted into financial and intellectual capital. In many technology start-ups, scientific research spawns technological applications
whose development then proceeds along trajectories
Strat. Entrepreneurship J., 6: 94–115 (2012)
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that are largely independent of university science. In
contrast, biotechnology start-ups collaborate with
university-based researchers, relying on input from
the cutting edge of basic science (Powell et al.,
1996; Cockburn and Stern, 2010).

Cluster 2: In science to do business
In Cluster 2 firms, academic organizing principles
were superseded by commercial concerns. Only two
of the 13 companies in Cluster 2 were founded by
amphibious scientists. These firms did not actively
publish in their formative years, and just under half
could claim a notable scientist among their founders.
Instead, more than two-thirds of the Cluster 2 firms
recruited senior managers from Big Pharma as
CEOs. Thus, where seasoned pharma executives
held the maestro’s baton, the ventures were less susceptible to the odd rhythms and tonalities of academic science. Instead, they remixed existing
commercial elements to produce innovative variations on the start-up theme. We should note, however,
that the executives who left the cozy confines of
pharmaceutical executive suites for unproven startups were risk takers in their own right. Although
they did not pursue radically inventive organizational models, they did have strong ideas about pursuing R&D in a different manner than had been done
previously in corporate settings. But publishing cutting-edge science for all the world to see ran counter
to their instincts.
As shown in Figure 1, the HCA results for Cluster
1 show remarkable cohesion, remaining essentially
unchanged across five levels of agglomeration. In
contrast, Cluster 2 splits into three subclusters at the
next level of allowable dissimilarity. Each subcluster’s attribute profile aligns with a distinct but preexisting approach to commercializing scientific
breakthroughs (see Table 3).

Cluster 2a
These six firms resembled commercial spin-offs,
except that the parent entity was a university or
nonprofit research institute rather than a corporation.
SIBIA (Salk Institute Biotechnology Industrial
Associates, Inc.) was literally a spin-off of the
storied Salk Institute, with a charter to commercialize the Institute’s scientific advances (Froelich,
1984). Guided by experienced pharma executives,
Cluster 2a firms were located close to their
Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society
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scientist-founders’ academic labs, yet did not adopt
a laboratory model of organizing. The unifying
theme in these firms’ histories is separation of the
academic from the commercial, whereas Cluster 1
firms were characterized by the transplant of the
academic into the commercial. The following statement by David Housman, a scientific founder of
Integrated Genetics, delineates a business vs. a university laboratory: ‘One reason I called this company
Integrated Genetics instead of something else was
because I wanted a company with the integrated
functions of research, development, and sales and
marketing, and not just R&D’ (Curwood, 1983).
Dominant influence: the pharmaceutical industry

Cluster 2a firms featured an experienced business
executive with a junior (or a minimally engaged
senior) academic scientist. Hybritech recruited a
mid-career pharma executive as CEO, while its
founding scientist was an assistant professor.
Genzyme’s president and CEO boasted a decade of
pharmaceutical management experience; its scientific founder was the assistant, not the lead investigator, on an NIH grant. Xoma’s founder had just
finished his medical residency; its first CEO was the
former president of Becton Dickinson’s microbiology systems division. Integrated Genetics’ chief
scientist-founder was a tenured professor at MIT, yet
he spent less than a day a week at the company. This
gave wide latitude to CEO Robert Carpenter, a West
Point graduate and Harvard MBA who had been a
division president at a multinational pharmaceutical
company.11 These disparities shaped the Cluster 2a
firms, none of which duplicated an academic
research culture. Instead, Cluster 2a firms favored
quick-to-market diagnostic technologies (Hybritech,
Integrated Genetics) or orphan drugs tailored to specific, small patient groups (Genzyme, ImmunoGen).
More than financiers: venture capital

Cluster 1’s venture capitalists were deeply engaged
in channeling money into the firms’ basic research
programs. In contrast, Cluster 2a’s VCs engaged in
management. In two companies (Hybritech and
11
Ted Greene of Hybritech, Henri Termeer of Genzyme, and
Robert Carpenter of Integrated Genetics were all recruited from
the pharmaceutical corporation Baxter Travenol. Higgins
(2005) has shown how Baxter and, to a lesser extent, Abbott,
had outsize influence on biotech, as numerous executives with
experience at managing product teams or divisions left these
second-tier companies for the allure of biotech.
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ImmunoGen), the VC was the founding CEO. In two
other companies (Genzyme and Integrated Genetics),
VCs occupied more traditional positions on the
board of directors, but exerted considerable influence on day-to-day operations. The practical orientation of the VCs complemented the pharma-bred
focus on penetrating existing markets with superior,
genetically engineered products, seeking a rapid
return on investment. In the words of David
Anderson, Integrated Genetics’ hands-on venture
capitalist, ‘What most (biotech firms) lack is a real
product focus and a real intense desire to get something out on the market. Not us’ (Curwood, 1983).
Application oriented: academic science

Only two of the six companies featured notable scientists among their founders. In one of these cases,
the distinguished scientist limited his involvement to
serving on the Science Advisory Board.12 Consistent
with a ‘spin-off’ model, the science conducted in
Cluster 2a companies led to marketable products,
but did not generate a large volume of highly cited
publications (see Table 3).
Cluster 2b
A second path to commercialization is signified by
three attributes: the lack of a blue-ribbon SAB, little
reliance on R&D contracts, and exclusive focus on
diagnostic products. These attributes cohere around
a brokerage model: rather than invest in expensive
R&D, these companies partnered with academic
labs, from which they licensed promising ideas and
tried to bring them to market.
Harvesting science for commerce

Without an internal R&D group pursuing basic
science, Cluster 2b firms had minimal need for an
SAB and offered few attractions as research partners. Their strategy was succinctly stated by Hubert
Schoemaker, Centocor’s first CEO: ‘We realized it
was a lot cheaper to roam academe and pay a royalty

back for what we developed than start our own
research facilities’ (Vaughan, 2000: 186). A more
aggressive brokerage approach was practiced by
Seattle-based Genetic Systems, whose founder,
Robert Nowinski, negotiated exclusive rights to 37
antibodies from his former employer (the Hutchinson
Center), then sublicensed them to another company
for $3.7 million (Wilson and Heath, 2001). Like
Cluster 1 companies, Cluster 2b firms were located
close to major research centers. Unlike Cluster 1
firms, however, their locations were not motivated
by proximity to labs, research seminars, or other
aspects of knowledge production. Rather, Cluster 2b
firms sought to maintain close relationships with
suppliers of potentially commercializable ideas.
Focus on existing markets

Going after diagnostic applications was a more rapid
path to profits. Genetic Systems’ initial product was
a chlamydia diagnostic. Codon’s initial focus was on
vaccines and the production of enzymes. Centocor’s
first product, a rabies test, was based on a monoclonal antibody licensed from the lab of one of its
founders. The test was designed to run on equipment
manufactured by Abbott Laboratories and WarnerLambert. Thus, Centocor not only made minimal
R&D investments, it also avoided developing its
own manufacturing and sales.
Nonamphibious scientists

Noted scientists were associated with the start up of
two of these three companies (Centocor and Genetic
Systems), but they played very different roles.
Centocor’s scientist-founder retained his position as
director of the Wistar Institute, a renowned research
center in Philadelphia, and was forced to resign his
directorship in Centocor prior to the company’s IPO.
In contrast, Genetic System’s Nowinski was head of
the virology lab at the Hutchinson Center prior to
joining the start-up. When he left the laboratory to
become chairman and CEO of the new venture, he
brought his entire 16-person research team with him.
He told Fortune magazine in 1987,

12

This scientist was Baruj Benacerraf, who earned the Nobel
for physiology/medicine in 1980 for his pioneering work in
immunology. Benacerraf was pivotal in attracting top scientists
to serve on ImmunoGen’s advisory board. In its first two years,
ImmunoGen had no lab space of its own, instead contracting
all of its research to the Dana Farber Cancer Institute, of which
Benacerraf was the president and CEO. Yet in his 1998 autobiography, he never mentions his involvement with ImmunoGen
(Benacerraf, 1998).
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‘I had been totally absorbed with research. All of
a sudden I was dealing with stockbrokers, bankers,
accountants, and pharmaceutical executives. It
gave me a tremendous sense of being in the middle
of the world. It changed my values fundamentally’
(Gannes, 1987: 9).
Strat. Entrepreneurship J., 6: 94–115 (2012)
DOI: 10.1002/sej

Amphibious Entrepreneurs and the Emergence of Organizational Forms
That change—from doing science to doing
deals—illustrates the stark contrast between Cluster
1 and Cluster 2b companies. With limited internal
research capability but ties to academic laboratories,
these companies played the role of brokers between
public science and commercial health care, a classic
source of recombinatorial innovation (Burt, 2009).
Cluster 2c
In contrast to Clusters 2a and 2b, the firms in Cluster
2c were located at some distance from the nearest
academic lab, three times as likely to have a repeat
entrepreneur among their founders, and almost
seven times more likely to grow through acquisition.
This attribute profile and the details of the case histories suggest a deliberate ‘by the book’ approach to
assembling a new biotech venture. Whereas many of
the other innovators were experimenting with new
organizational forms (essentially making it up on the
fly), the founders of Cluster 2c firms followed a
conventional template for high-tech ventures, with
some adjustments for the substantial investments in
R&D required for biotech.
Dominant influence: venture finance

That this formula was replicable is evidenced by the
presence of two companies with the same founder:
Genex and Cytogen, the first and second forays into
biotech by Princeton-based dealmaker Robert
Johnston. In fact, when Johnston set out to assemble
Genex in 1977, he sought a CEO steeped in science
yet comfortable in commerce. In an unorthodox
move, he placed a ‘CEO wanted’ ad in the journal
Science. He selected Leslie Glick, a 37-year-old scientist with a PhD in zoology from Columbia, a postdoctorate at Princeton, and an entrepreneurial track
record as founder of his own profitable tissue culture
company. Johnston and Glick began researching the
business opportunities opened by recombinant DNA
technology, while searching for an accomplished
academic researcher to join the founding team. Like
Genex, Amgen was the brainchild of experienced
financiers—Silicon Valley investors William Bowes
and Franklin ‘Pitch’ Johnson. They, too, recruited a
senior scientist, a scientific advisory board, and a
PhD-carrying CEO.
A subordinate role for science

Bowes had been an investor in Cetus (see Cluster 1)
and did not want to replicate its chaotic atmosphere
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of academic exploration (Duncan, 2005). His handpicked CEO—George Rathmann, an Abbott vice
president with a PhD in chemistry from Princeton—
insisted on having Amgen’s high-powered scientific
advisory board report to him, rather than vice versa
(Rathmann, 2004:21). Ironically, one of Rathmann’s
first tasks as CEO was to fire Amgen’s amphibious
chief scientist, a noted UCLA biologist. At Genex,
Johnston and Glick persuaded David Jackson, a
tenured molecular biologist at the University of
Michigan, to join the venture—in Jackson’s words,
‘just this incredibly countercultural thing to do at
that point’ (pers. comm.)—and leave behind the academic emphasis on knowledge production:
‘It takes a lot of time to publish stuff, and (at
Genex) we were always under enormous time
pressure to meet various milestones. And there
was a concern about disclosing stuff prematurely,
before we’d really had a chance to capitalize on
it’ (pers. comm.).
Moreover, the dealmakers who assembled Amgen,
Genex, and Cytogen chose corporate locations that
were physically and symbolically removed from
their academic headwaters, prioritizing instead such
practicalities as the smog-free air and affordable
housing of Thousand Oaks, California (Amgen), and
proximity to regulatory agencies in the Washington,
D.C., area (Genex).
Serial entrepreneurs

Three of the companies—Amgen, Cytogen, and
Genex—are distinguished by the presence of a serial
(but not amphibious) entrepreneur on the founding
team. The fourth– Enzo Biochem—is an outlier,
though it too exhibited the attributes of a deliberate,
business-focused bioscience venture. Enzo’s business initially focused on DNA probe diagnostics,
which offered quicker profitability than developing
new medicines. Like Amgen and Genex, Enzo also
grew by acquisition, and its location—New York
City—never became a hub of biotech activity
(Whittington, Owen-Smith, and Powell, 2009).
Implications: do templates shape outcomes?
Our findings highlight how the attributes clustered
into two camps: ventures that were ‘in business to do
science’ vs. those that were ‘in science to do business.’ We found that the science-based firms formed
Strat. Entrepreneurship J., 6: 94–115 (2012)
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a more coherent cluster, whereas the commerceoriented firms split into three subclusters, each with
a distinctive stamp. The organizations literature is
replete with studies that build upon Stinchcombe’s
(1965) imprinting hypothesis, which emphasizes the
tenacity with which circumstances at the time of an
organization’s founding continue to exert an influence on its evolutionary trajectory. Most studies
stress how the prior experiences of founding teams
shape organizational performance through the transfer of status and/or experience (Burton et al., 2002;
Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Phillips, 2002; Shane
and Stuart, 2002; Chatterji, 2009). Precisely how
imprinting shapes work practices is seldom explored
(see Johnson, 2007, for an exception). And how outcomes are experienced in new settings is mistakenly
assumed to be straightforward.
Consider the ambiguity of ‘performance.’ In
terms of time-to-IPO and time-to-acquisition, the
averages for Cluster 1 and Cluster 2 are identical:
five years to IPO and 20.7 years to acquisition.
Our familiarity with the circumstances of each
firm’s survival or demise, however, makes us wary
of attaching a common meaning to such metrics.
Hybritech, for example, survived for eight years
before being acquired by Eli Lilly at a high valuation. Standard entrepreneurial performance metrics
would count this a success—a profitable liquidity
event (Stuart and Sorenson, 2003). But Hybritech’s
founders and senior staff soon chafed under the
oversight of a corporate parent and within a year,
most resigned to start or join new ventures of
their own (Mitton, 1990). Immunex mourned its
1991 acquisition by Amgen, seeing it as the end
of its cherished ‘Immunoid’ culture and the beginning of life in a large corporation (Dietrich, 2003).
In contrast, DNAX was acquired by ScheringPlough less than two years after its founding, yet
it was allowed to continue as an autonomous
research lab for another decade. Researchers there
seemed to not notice the change in ownership,
except that Schering-Plough required key card
security be installed on DNAX’s formerly open
doors (Kornberg, 1998: 130). Genetics Institute
staff chose a subterranean strategy of resistance
after its 1996 acquisition and continued to publish
and patent under the GI label, reckoning that merger
activity was so widespread among Big Pharma
that it would not be noticed. And Genentech
launched a vociferous campaign of opposition to
Roche’s 2009 takeover, decrying an end to Camelot
and the death of its scientific mission (Chang,
Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society

2009). Finally, a small group of companies—
ImmunoGen, Repligen, and Xoma—survive as
independent entities, yet have never made a profit
and are derisively labeled ‘biotech zombies’ by
some observers (Pisano, 2006).
Such contradictions point to the impossibility of
judging something as subjective as success across
divergent registers of worth and support a view of
organizations as malleable entities, capable of being
bent to a variety of purposes by founders with different goals. What was success to a commercially
oriented firm was a loss of independence to a science-oriented variant. Similarly, publishing was an
important metric for the Cluster 1 firms, yet much
less so for those in Cluster 2. Accordingly, we
searched the ISI Web of Science database for all
scientific publications with at least one author who
was affiliated with one of the early companies in our
sample. This produced a publication count for each
firm for the 10 years following its initial public
offering. We use the post-IPO period, rather than
founding date, because firms might have published
to attract Wall Street’s attention then stopped doing
so after they went public.
From the publication counts, we generated a citation analysis for each firm and aggregated these by
cluster (again, see Table 3). Cluster 1 firms produced, on average, 584 scientific publications during
the 10 years following their IPOs—more than double
the number of the next-closest cluster (Cluster 2c).
In addition, the papers produced by Cluster 1 firms
boasted 50 percent higher average citation counts.
Clearly, the rules of the invisible college, transposed
into these ventures, dictated continued engagement
with the domain of open science. As active participants in the worldwide scientific community, such
firms set in motion a series of changes that are still
playing out in the labs of academic and commercial
science. Indeed, Liu and Stuart (2011) trace the
present day tendency by private firms to participate
in open communities of science and technology to
these early biotech boundary crossings.

CONCLUSION
We sought to answer the questions of where new
organizational forms come from and how bundles of
practices are combined in science and technologybased ventures. We added to this central concern an
accompanying question about different types of
entrepreneurs and their role in the emergence of
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novel organizational forms. Rather than emphasize
the discovery of opportunities or broader population-level patterns, our contribution is a relational
approach that focuses on two mechanisms of assembly and highlights how ‘amphibious’ entrepreneurs
are able to bring organizing assumptions from one
social domain into another. Previous studies of organizational genealogy have emphasized both an
entrepreneur’s prominence as a signal of the quality
of a new venture and the transfer of experience from
previous employers. The former highlights the
inheritance of legitimacy, whereas the latter stresses
the transfer of technical knowledge and capabilities.
Our analysis underscores both factors: social capital,
in the form of distinguished scientists and proven
pharmaceutical executives; and routines, expressed
through scientific, corporate, and venture finance
knowledge. But we point out that how routines are
transferred and legitimacy conferred are contingent
on both context and social distance. When resources
and status are moved to a proximate domain, reconfigurations occur; but when they travel to unfamiliar
settings, novel conceptualizations of what a firm
should look like are rendered possible.
In the short run, the impact of the skilled individuals involved in assembling these earliest biotech
firms loomed large, yet the pivotal skill set in generating a novel organizational form was not the individual creativity of the improviser (Miner, Bassoff,
and Moorman, 2001) nor the resourcefulness of the
bricoleur (Baker and Nelson, 2005). Rather, our
emphasis on how attributes fit together is a story of
pragmatic search, where the tools of everyday practice were used in new and unfamiliar settings, at a
time when there was a greenfield. This leads us to
stress that relationships constituted both founders
and their companies. In those settings where the
organizing principles of an academic life science lab
were installed in toto with financing from the capital
markets in lieu of government grants, the ensuing
interactions formed novel entities with effects that
extended far beyond their creators’ initial intentions.
For example, publishing in top-tier scientific journals was unusual for start-up companies; but projectbased work in which scientists dropped their current
research to assist others on whatever leads proved
hottest was equally uncommon in the academy. The
companies published and patented, even as they collaborated with ostensible competitors. Venture
financing was necessary, but of a magnitude and
duration not encountered in prior information technology start-ups, so new ways of repurposing scholCopyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society
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arly outputs as prototypes had to be fashioned. In
contrast, when science took a back seat to commercial goals, innovative steps were climbed to bring
new biotechnology products to market, albeit in
companies that looked more comparable to other
high-tech ventures.
Thus, our fundamental finding is that when entrepreneurs launch new businesses in adjacent fields
with which they are familiar, the organizing process
is marked by reconfiguration, the reassembly of borrowed elements from known sources. Such bricolage generates innovations, and often produces new
organizations, but does not result in novel forms. In
contrast, when entrepreneurs enter a distant domain,
they are incapable of drawing on that domain’s
established templates and tools of organizing.
Instead, they rely on the frameworks from the former
domain with which they are familiar and, in the
process, generate dramatically novel models. We
argue that this mechanism of transposition may
result more from naïveté than prescience and is more
pragmatic than calculative.
Periodically, scholars call for new theories to
make sense of contemporary organizations (Daft and
Lewin, 1990; Greenwood and Miller, 2010). We
counter that understanding novel forms of organizing does not require ‘new’ theories. Instead, we have
followed more classic ideas from the Carnegie
School (March and Simon, 1958; Simon, 1982) and
symbolic interactionism (Mead, 1934; Blumer,
1969; Becker, 1986) and paired them with fresh
insights from the networks (White, 2008) and evolvability (Kauffman, 2000) literatures. All forms of
organization face the challenge of coordinating work
and mobilizing resources. The manner in which a
division of labor is fashioned and resources accessed
determines whether an organizational form is novel
or not. Some organizations tackle these challenges
by assembling recognizable routines in creative
ways; others bring unfamiliar routines together to
produce something that stands apart from previous
practice. We have offered both an analytical and
methodological lens on this question of design—a
focus on how distant and proximate attributes are
combined. Our sociology of compounds can be
readily applied to the study other domains—the
open source world of Linux and Wikipedia, political
reforms that mix state funding with private provision, or newer modes of contracting. The key is to
isolate the elements that are used to ‘solve’ protean
organizational problems. Our use of HCA represents
a fruitful methodological approach.
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Nelson and Winter (1982: 130) define innovation
as ‘a recombination of conceptual and physical
materials that were previously in existence.’ We
take a further step in removing the prefix from
‘recombination’ and articulating a mechanism by
which previously unfamiliar elements are combined
for the first time. Consider, as but one example,
how inserting scholarly practices into a new firm
transforms the nature of science. Nobel laureate
and DNAX founder Arthur Kornberg (1998: 139)
commented that:
‘In a conventional academic department, there are
a dozen professors and each one is an entity unto
himself; a duchy I would call it. Professors are
self-sustaining . . . one can be successful and surrounded by failures; it is possible. DNAX is not
organized that way . . . when a discovery is made
at DNAX, everyone has access to it and can build
on it, advance it. That doesn’t occur in any academic organization . . . or in pharmaceutical companies where there are layers of authority and
bureaucracy.’
We maintain that the role of naïveté has been
underestimated, if not completely overlooked. In the
case of biotechnology, the cadre of scientist-entrepreneurs that founded the first-generation companies
may not have known ‘how to run a business,’ but
they most assuredly knew how to run a top-flight
research laboratory. As this type of organizing
knowledge was transposed into a new setting, radical
social novelty was unleashed, eventually reverberating back into the domains from which it was transported. What began as an odd experimental approach
to mounting a new venture is described today as the
‘life sciences innovation system’ that ‘replaced the
traditional divide between university science and
pharmaceutical innovation’ (Cockburn and Stern,
2010: 26). This disruptive organizational model not
only led to a distinctive DBF form, it fed back into
the conservative halls of the academy and the large
pharmaceutical laboratories and led to the remaking
of the boundaries between public and private science.
Today, both domains are fundamentally transformed—interdisciplinary, project based, entrepreneurial, and intensively networked.
More broadly, we suggest that disruptive organizational models that transgress social and economic
boundaries are consequential because they alter the
very texture of the social worlds in which we live.
Whether in the form of an evangelical church that
Copyright © 2012 Strategic Management Society

teaches finance, a software company that purports
to be the world’s library by use of a search algorithm
that was the product of basic science research, or
nonprofit ventures that aim to assist poor women
in becoming economically self-supporting, such
cross-realm confluences are fertile sources of social
and economic change.
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